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Moving Beyond European and Latin American Typologies:
The Peculiarities of AKP’s Populism in Turkey
Yaprak Gürsoy
Department of Politics and International Relations, Aston University, Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT
Despite the growing literature on Turkish populism, there is yet no
consensus on how best to categorise the Justice and Development
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP). This article argues that this
lack of consensus is due to a selective focus on the attributes of AKP’s
populism. Indeed, when the party’s features are examined holistically,
it does not neatly conform to the dominant typologies of populism,
which were conceived mostly for European and Latin American exam-
ples. For historical reasons, AKP’s populist discourse deﬁnes “the peo-
ple” versus “the elite” in civilisational terms and combines this with
strategies of neo-liberalism, strong party organisation and grassroots
mobilisation. This blend of populism distinguishes the AKP case from
the exclusionary/inclusionary and classical/neo-liberal/radical typolo-
gies previously identiﬁed by the literature. However, the Bharatiya
Janata Party in India and the Thai Rak Thai Party in Thailand have
similar attributes to the AKP, drawing attention to the need to move
beyond the existing ideological and strategic approaches to populism
and towards a more comprehensive socio-cultural approach. The
article contributes to the literature on populism by highlighting possi-
ble avenues for further research based on such a comprehensive




Islam; Turkey; India; Thailand
The Justice andDevelopment Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP) in Turkey won the
general elections ﬁrst in 2002 and until 2019 has renewed its mandate in every poll, except
for the June 2015 elections, in which the party received the plurality of votes but not the
majority of the seats in parliament. The party also called three successful referendums in
2007, 2010 and 2017, fundamentally changing the 1982 constitution and securing
a presidential system of government with an exceptionally powerful head of state. In the
June 2018 elections, this new system gave AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan the pre-
sidency, with expanded powers, while the party (along with a partner) received themajority
of seats in the nowweakened parliament. The strength of the AKP and Erdoğan over a span
of more than 15 years has often been attributed to its populism (Dinçşahin 2012). Hence,
their longevity is not only interesting for specialists of Turkish politics but raises important
issues for the broader literature on populism.
The AKP illustrates how populism in an already fragile democratic regime can further
erode freedoms and increase polarisation, leading to authoritarianism (Castaldo 2018; Esen
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and Gumuscu 2016; Levitsky and Loxton 2013). Turkey is one of the few countries that
highlights the dangers of prolonged rule by populists and thereby contributes to the
literature on the relationship between populism and democracy and what happens when
populists are in power (for examples of this literature, see Albertazzi and McDonnell
2015; Müller 2016; Rovirra Kaltwasser 2012).
Partly due to these consequences of AKP’s populism, in recent years, scholarly works
looking into the Turkish case have burgeoned, both as single-case studies and in compar-
ison with others. Although these studies have yielded insightful results, there is no
consensus on what type of populism the AKP belongs to. Most describe it as “neo-liberal
populism” (for example, Akcay 2018; Bozkurt 2013; Özdemir 2015; Yıldırım 2009). Others
use various other adjectives, such as “Islamic” (Hadiz 2014, 2016; Göle 2017), “authoritar-
ian” or “nativist” (Arat-Koç 2018) that are more in-line with a type the general literature
refers to as “exclusionary populism.” Similarly, some see aﬃnities with Latin American
cases (Aytaç and Öniş 2014; Castaldo 2018; Selçuk 2016). Others draw on similarities with
Eastern European (see Yabanci and Taleski 2018) or Middle Eastern and Muslim-majority
countries (Hadiz 2014, 2016; Kirdiş and Drhimeur 2016). Thus, the Turkey-speciﬁc
literature exhibits no consensus regarding the type of populism and regional category the
AKP ﬁts into. Given the signiﬁcance of the AKP for the broader literature on populism,
however, it is necessary to ask: What is the best way to categorise AKP’s populism? Only
through this exercise can future research properly interpret the AKP’s longevity in power
and the consequences of its prolonged rule.
The divergence of opinion over the categorisation of the AKP results from a selective
focus on one of its main attributes relevant to the study of populism. Studies on Turkey
emphasise one of the following features of the AKP: (i) the ideological and discursive
characteristics of the party and its leader; (ii) economic, welfare and distributive policies
of the party in government; or (iii) political and organisational strategies, such as the
linkages of the leader with his supporters. Scholars who focus on the ﬁrst aspect, draw
attention to the AKP’s Islamic/religious, nationalist, nativist and exclusionary charac-
teristics (Arat-Koç 2018; Erçetin and Erdoğan 2018). This interpretation results in
comparisons with Eastern European, Middle Eastern or other Islamic cases (Kirdiş
and Drhimeur 2016; Yabanci and Taleski 2018). This contrasts with those scholars who
stress the AKP’s economic and distributional policies as deﬁning of its populism. These
authors classify the AKP as a case of “neo-liberal populism” and/or situate it within the
Latin American “family” of populisms (for example, Akcay 2018; Aytaç and Öniş 2014;
Bozkurt 2013; Özdemir 2015; Yıldırım 2009). Similarly, those who study the organisa-
tional and leadership linkages of the AKP also tend to compare it with Latin American
cases, but diverge on the classiﬁcation as “movement populist” with a relatively strong
grassroots intermediary organisation (Castaldo 2018, 474) or as more personalistic type
of populism with unmediated links between the leader and “the people” (Selçuk 2016).
Acknowledging that a focus on one attribute of AKP’s populism leads to divergences of
categorisation, the primary aim of this article is to provide a comprehensive point of view
by analysing the three aspects of AKP’s populism together. After providing a brief overview
of the existing approaches to populism, the ﬁrst section applies the most commonly used
typologies of populism based on Europe and Latin America to Turkey. This step would
show that once the discourses, economic policies and organisational characteristics of the
AKP are considered together, the case does not ﬁt into any of the existent typologies.
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Indeed, this ﬁnding explains the diﬀerent categorisations and inconsistencies found in the
Turkey-speciﬁc literature, as described above. The second section adopts a more compre-
hensive, socio-cultural approach to the study of populism, as recently advocated by scholars
such as Hadiz (2014, 2016) and Ostiguy (2017) and moves beyond the typologies based on
Europe and Latin America by looking at comparative Asian cases, namely the Indian
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Thailand’s now defunct Thais Love Thais Party (Thai
Rak Thai, TRT). Although there is no agreed upon “Asian type of populism,” this exercise is
justiﬁable because there are scholars who have noted AKP’s similarities with the BJP
(Harriss 2015; Ohm 2015) or the TRT (Bozkurt 2013; Yıldırım 2009). However, these
authors have not elaborated in-depth on these similarities.
The main ﬁnding of this article is that the AKP’s populist discourse is civilisational,
its main economic policies are neo-liberal and its mobilisation strategy rests on a strong
party organisation with active grassroots support. This combination of attributes sets
the AKP apart from most of its counterparts in Europe and Latin America, but has
a similar blend of characteristics seen in at least two Asian cases, India and Thailand.
While this ﬁnding is signiﬁcant for Turkish political studies, as the conclusion will
discuss in detail, it is also pertinent to the broader literature on populism. By serving as
a hypothesis-generating or theory-inﬁrming case study, this article shows how the
broader literature on types of populism can be reﬁned and expanded by using more
comprehensive approaches and by systematically analysing Asian cases in comparison
with each other and with Latin America and Europe.
Applying Existing Typologies to the Turkish Case
The literature on populism is wide and has been in a constant state of expansion since the
1960s. Despite divergent readings, most authors agree that an enmity between “the people”
and “the elite” is the essential core of any populism. Most scholars also agree that populists
diverge from each other when they refer to an “idealised heartland,” advocate decisive
action against an “extreme crisis” and when they act like “chameleon[s], adopting the
colours of [their] environment” (Taggart 2000, 2). In other words, there is relative con-
sensus in the literature that one case of populismwould not exactly be the same as any other
since there would be country and policy diﬀerences in diﬀerent epochs, but all populists
would pit what they believe to be “the people” against “the elite” in the name of the former.
The AKP ﬁts this deﬁnition of populism although the way it has demarcated “the people”
and “the elite,” as well as the extreme crisis, has changed from the party’s inception in 2001
until 2018 (the timeframe of this article). The adaptive nature of the party and its lack of
well-deﬁned values is, in fact, one of the reasons why the AKP can be best described as
populist (Özpek and Yaşar 2018).
Once scholars who work on populism move beyond this basic level of agreement, there
are diﬀerences of opinion on how best to conceptualise, categorise and methodologically
study populism and this is where AKP’s categorisation also becomes divergent in the
literature. There are at least three distinct, but not necessarily mutually exclusive,
approaches: studying populism as an ideology, as a discursive style or as a political strategy
(Gidron and Bonikowski 2013, 5–17). For the purposes of this article, the ideological and
political strategic approaches are the most critical as typologies of these genres applied to
Europe and Latin America have produced the most extensive body of work and have been
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adopted by analysts of Turkish populism. In the following sections, I will look into the
categorisations of these two approaches and demonstrate that, although the AKP shares
many commonalities with exclusionary and neo-liberal types of populism identiﬁed by
these genres, it also has attributes that are distinct and deﬁes easy categorisation. This
ﬁnding justiﬁes the need to move beyond the ideological and strategic approaches and their
typologies focused on Europe and Latin America.
The Ideological Approach and the AKP: Exclusionary versus Inclusionary Types of
Populism
The ideological approach commonly deﬁnes populism in reference to Mudde’s (2004,
543) oft-cited conceptualisation, as “a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’
versus ‘the corrupt elite’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the
volonté générale (general will) of the people.” The ideological approach argues that
populism does not have the elaborate precision, coherence or “thickness” of traditional
left and right ideologies, such as socialism or fascism, but “can be easily combined with
[them]” (Mudde 2004, 544).
Moreover, the precise description of populism’s core concept, “the people,” might vary
from one case to another, leading to inclusionary and exclusionary populisms. The
inclusive type of populism sees “the people” as mostly the “plebeians, the common people”
and aims to represent the groups that were previously barred from politics. As such,
inclusive populism has the potential to incorporate the masses into politics and broaden
democracy (Filc 2015, 265–266). In this type of populism, the diﬀerence between “the elite”
and “the people” is mostly deﬁned in socio-economic and class terms. The exclusionary
populist type, however, sees “the people” mostly as a cultural and ethnic community. The
antagonism between “the elite” and “the people” is outlined in xenophobic and nativist
terms (Hellmann 2017, 165). Due to this narrow view, groups outside of the community are
perceived as the threatening “other” and exclusionary populism aims to expel them from
society. While the exclusionary type is associated mostly with radical right populism
(Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 155), inclusionary populism is mostly leftist (Filc
2015, 273–274). As stated by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013, 148), “European
populism is predominantly exclusive, while Latin American populism is chieﬂy inclusive.”
Given these basic deﬁnitions, the AKP’s populism is usually identiﬁed to ﬁt in with
exclusionary populism seen in Europe. This type of populism emphasises ethnic identities
in deﬁning “the people” and adheres to a “xenophobic version of nationalism” excluding
the “non-native (alien) people and values” and seeing them as a menace to “the nation
state” (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 168). As it will be elaborated below with its
deﬁnition of “the people” in a way that excludes the opposition Kurdish ethnic minority,
the non-Sunni and the secular, the AKP conforms to this type. Unlike the inclusionary type
of populismwhich deﬁnes “the people” as heterogeneous,multi-ethnic andmulti-racial, the
AKP rejects those who are not believed to be “natives.”
Despite these similarities with the exclusionary type of populism, however, in two
respects, the AKP’s discourse and policies diverge from this grouping in practice
(although not necessarily in theory). First, immigration has been one of the main issues
in European radical right populism (see Stanley 2017; Taggart 2017). As Filc (2015, 266)
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argues, “exclusionary populism expresses how certain social groups confront the threat
of exclusion and subsequent dissolution of their identity and subjectivity by excluding
weaker groups, that is, migrant workers or ethnic minorities.” While the Turkish case of
populism ﬁts into the “ethnic minorities” part of this expression, it does not conform to
the “migrant workers.” In the AKP’s discourse and policies, immigration has so far
never been an important element that distinguishes the natives from the aliens. From
the 1950s until 2010, Turkey was a country of negative net migration since more people
emigrated especially to Europe than those moving to the country (Net Migration Rate
2017). This makes immigration historically a non-issue. With the arrival of Syrian
refugees, this has become a thorny matter in Turkish politics, but the emphasis on
Islam in the AKP’s ideology has prevented Syrian refugees from being the basis of
exclusion, at least until 2018. Thus, the so far open doors policy of the AKP resembles
the inclusionary type of populism and their calls for “normalizing migrants’ citizenship
status” (Filc 2015, 273).
The second element that distinguishes the AKP from the exclusionary variant of populism
is its policies explicitly targeting the poor and the class dynamic that underscores the
diﬀerences between “the people” and “the elite.” In this material dimension that sets apart
inclusionary and exclusionary types of populism, the AKP approaches the former. As will be
explained below, universal policies of welfare were abandoned by the AKP, but they were
substituted with social assistance programmes in healthcare and distribution of aid, resem-
bling Latin American populism’s aim to “establish . . . the conditions for a good life for ‘the
people’,” more than the European radical right’s “welfare chauvinism” geared towards the
“protection” of already existing universal beneﬁts from the immigrants (Mudde and Rovira
Kaltwasser 2013, 160). Throughmaterial distribution of aid, religious symbolism and political
empowerment, the AKP and Erdoğan have given the conservative poor and the previously
marginalised classes, including Kurds who vote for the party, a “sense of belonging” and
“recognition and self-worth,” buttressed by “policies aimed at improving” their conditions,
similar to Latin American populist leaders (Filc 2015, 266).
If the experience of colonialism is what leads to diﬀerent versions of populism in Europe
and Latin America, Turkey is, indeed, perpetually stuck in between (Filc 2015). It is
a country that is heir to an empire that ruled vast territories for centuries, but that was
substantially weakened after the eighteenth century and nearly colonised by the European
powers afterWorldWar I. This identity as both a coloniser and colonised is reﬂected in the
AKP’s populism today. On the one hand, Erdoğan has called himself “black” (Arat-Koç
2018; Radikal, March 17, 2014) and the AKP’s current discourse includes anti-imperialism
and anti-Westernism similar to populist leaders in colonised Latin America. On the other
hand, xenophobia and feelings of ethnic superiority, as well as pan-Islamic desires in
foreign policy, are evident like populism in Europe. In short, the AKP does not perfectly
ﬁt into either inclusionary or exclusionary types of populism and these categorisations are
insuﬃcient in characterising the party.
The Strategic Approach and the AKP: Classic, Neo-liberal, Radical Populisms
The strategic approach to populism is in agreement with the ideological approach that the
core aspect of populism is the antagonism between homogenously deﬁned “elites” and “the
people.” However, the strategic approach advocates studying the concept by considering
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diﬀerences between “political choices, political organisation, and forms of mobilization”
(Gidron and Bonikowski 2013, 10). Although there is signiﬁcant divergence among
scholars who adopt the strategic approach, their emphasis on “populism as a mode of
political strategy” unites them.
Based mostly on the Latin American experience, populism identiﬁed in the strategic
approach can be divided into three sub-types – classical, neo-liberal and radical populism –
corresponding to mostly diﬀerent time periods, but also related to various economic
policies and organisational attributes (de la Torre 2017). The classical populism of the
1930s, exempliﬁed by Juan and Eva Perón in Argentina and Vargas in Brazil, for the most
part claimed to represent the workers and applied polices of import substitution indus-
trialisation. They incorporated labour into politics by giving themmore voice and expand-
ing the political franchise. Neo-liberal populists, such as Menem in Argentina, Fujimori in
Peru and Collar de Mello in Brazil, emerged in the 1990s and “abandoned nationalist and
statist policies of their classical predecessors” by applying neo-liberal principles usually to
the detriment of the collective beneﬁts of labour (de la Torre 2017, 199). Finally, the radical
populism of Chávez in Venezuela, Morales in Bolivia and Correa in Ecuador in the 2000s
came to the fore as a result of dissatisfaction with neo-liberalism and representative politics.
Among other policies, these leaders “relied on state intervention in the economy in the
name of distributing wealth and reducing poverty and inequality” which they ﬁnanced
through the export of natural resources (de la Torre 2017, 201).
In terms of organisational attributes, most authors in this genre argue that “populism can
be associated with a variety of speciﬁc organisational types that share one common feature:
absence of autonomywithin themovement” (Barr 2009, 42). Nomatter how “thin” or “thick”
the party organisations are, populists form “plebiscitarian linkages” between the leaders and
supporters, where the latter become subordinate to the former and participate “in the
decision-making process . . . only episodic[ally] and only at a speciﬁc point” controlled by
the leader (Barr 2009, 36).
This commonality, however, does not mean that organisational attributes are unimpor-
tant. Such attributes are, in fact, associated with diﬀerent types of populism. For instance,
Roberts (2006, 129–133) argues that classical populists built strong party organisations and/or
relied on the mobilisation of civil society (mostly labour unions). Like their historical
counterparts, radical populists, such as Chávez, formed grassroots organisations and socially
mobilised supporters to defend against elites if they were confronted with extra-electoral
opposition forces, such as the military. Yet, for the most part, recent populists and most
notably neo-liberal populists have not formed links with civil society and have chosen not to
build strong party organisations (Roberts 1995). This lack of organisation in neo-liberal
populism was also observed by Weyland (1999, 381), who deﬁnes populism (in contrast to
others in this approach) as a strategy where “the leader reaches the followers in a direct, quasi-
personal manner that bypasses established intermediary organisations, especially parties”
(also see Weyland 2001). This is why neo-liberalism can be compatible with populism: at
a moment when severe economic restructuring had to be carried out, the direct, non-
organisational manner in which the populist leaders appealed to the masses became an
advantage in carrying out reforms against vested and more organised interests.
On the face of it, the AKP and its economic neo-liberalism seem to belong to this
variety and contrast with leftist populism in Latin America. It shares with neo-liberal
populism the common elements of integration with global markets, privatisation and
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retrenchment of universal welfare beneﬁts (Aytaç and Öniş 2014, 49–51). It also shares
with neo-liberal populism the use of selective and targeted distributions of beneﬁts to
the poor that rely on community-based projects (Akcay 2018; Bozkurt 2013; Özdemir
2015). Similar to Fujimori’s Peru, in Turkey under Erdoğan, “social policies have relied
on direct, highly paternalistic relationships that are conducive to the microlevel
exchange of material beneﬁts for political support, even in the context of relative
macroeconomic austerity” (Roberts 1995, 106).
Yet, despite these similarities in economic policies, the AKP diverges from the Latin
American neo-liberal populist pattern in its organisational attributes. Instead of weakening
his party after getting elected like other neo-liberal populists (Weyland 1999, 386–387),
Erdoğan has continued to rely on his party’s grassroots network and municipalities to win
votes and to distribute social assistance, in part to counter-balance neo-liberal policies.
Perhaps more crucially, Erdoğan quickly mobilised his followers on the streets against the
2016 coup attempt, relying in part on this grassroots network. The ability and choice of
mobilisation on the streets against an attack is similar to radical populists, but quite unlike
neo-liberal populists. Moreover, although Erdoğan was directly elected as the president of the
Republic –a position that could have allowed him to form more of an unmediated link with
the voters – he deliberately chose to change the constitution so that the presidency would not
be non-partisan and that he could continue to be the AKP’s leader. Weyland (1999, 387)
argues that “nonpopulist leaders rely on parties and reinforce them . . . nonpopulist chief
executives work with and through parties,” which is a characterisation that can also be used
paradoxically for populist Erdoğan’s relationship with the AKP (and perhaps even with his
coalitional partner since 2016, the Nationalist Action Party). Finally, although Erdoğan and
the AKP have maintained a distance from some “associations of vested interests,” such as
labour organisations, they have had organic links with a number of business associations,
charities and other pro-AKP civil society groups. It is precisely this intermediation of vested
interests, such as the government-dependent trade unions and confederations (like Hak-İş,
Eğitim-Bir Sen and Memur-Sen) and women’s organisations (like KADEM, AK-DER), that
has guaranteed continued loyalty across classes (Yabanci 2016).
Taking everything into consideration, the AKP has characteristics parallel to
classical or radical populists in organisational terms, but is similar to neo-liberal
populists in economic policies. Thus, its blend of populism does not resonate with
the types of populism that were identiﬁed by the strategic approach and the literature
on Latin America. This, however, does not mean that the AKP is a unique case. The
main point of this section, along with the discussion on the inclusionary versus
exclusionary categorisation of populism, was to show why it is not surprising that
the AKP’s populism in the Turkey-speciﬁc literature was labelled variously as neo-
liberal, Islamic or nativist due to a selective focus on some of its attributes, rather than
a comprehensive approach. This section also showed the limits of the literature on
Europe and Latin America, as well as the ideological and strategic approaches’
typologies based on these two continents, when applied to Turkey. As the next section
will demonstrate, however, the AKP’s populism may be similar to other cases from
other regions, but making this argument would also entail adopting a comprehensive
understanding of populism, which the next section will brieﬂy discuss.
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Moving Beyond Ideational and Strategic Approaches to Populism
By demonstrating how theAKP does not ﬁt into any existent typology, this article advocates
moving beyond the ideological and strategic approaches that dominate the literature. The
ideological approach acknowledges that the core of populism can be combined with other
country-speciﬁc features. Likewise, most scholars who work on the strategic approach agree
that populists adopt diﬀerent policies, organisational characteristics and mobilisation
instruments. Thus, this type of comprehensive approach would not necessarily go against
the existing research genres but expand their deﬁnitions and typologies.
There are several scholars who successfully combine these approaches. According to
Ostiguy (2017, 92), for instance, populism is about ideology, discourses, strategies and
more: it is “a spectacle, a show, a performance”; it “is always anti-elitist, though it can be
quite top-down in its organisation and the nature of the elite antagonized can vary widely.”
More speciﬁcally, “[i]n claiming to represent, and at times to embody, a – neglected – true
‘us-ness,’ it ﬂaunts a politically or socially ‘unpresentable Other,’ a historical by-product of
an allegedly ‘civilizing process,’ and champions it as the authentic ‘Self’ of the nation”
(Ostiguy 2017, 92–93). The civilisational discourses and performances of populists may
include religion and ethnicity, but populists also tap into historically shaped divisions that
have led to feelings of social and cultural isolation and represent those who feel denigrated
by the civilisational project of elites. According to Ostiguy (2017, 75–76), the “civilizational
project”would not be the same in each country and it can range “from liberalism, to multi-
culturalism,” from European uniﬁcation to racial tolerance. Despite the variation, in every
instance, it would entail the creation of “oﬃcial discourse and policies” by “the elite,”
delineating what is “decent” and “proper.” This elite project would expect everyone in
society to comply with the same “ways and manners,” scorning those who do not. In
opposition to this “proper” civilisational project, populists represent those who were
“allegedly both damaged and ‘swept under the rug’ by oﬃcial discourses and policies.”
Thus, according to this socio-cultural approach, the speciﬁc attributes of populism can be
properly examined only through a comprehensive analysis of the social, cultural and
political antagonisms that historically took shape in each context.
Hadiz’s approach to populism (2016, 20) concurs with those “that place the concerns
of political economy and historical sociology at the forefront. This is in contrast to
approaches that highlight populism’s discursive, ideational or organisational aspects.”
In his study, Hadiz speciﬁcally analyses the possibilities of cross-class alliances for
Indonesian, Turkish and Egyptian Islamic populists given these countries’ historical
socio-political dynamics since the Cold War era, as well as their interactions with the
market economy and globalisation.
Ostiguy and Hadiz are not in explicit conversation with one another and have diﬀerent
goals. Ostiguy aims to deﬁne populism and establish the socio-cultural approach; Hadiz
explains the relative success of various populist parties in Muslim-majority countries. Yet,
they share a comprehensive understanding of populism and look at the historically shaped
civilisational antagonisms and alliances that cross-cut economic interests. Both authors
demonstrate that populism, using Ostiguy’s (2017, 77) terms, “connect[s] deeply with
a society’s history, existing group diﬀerences, identities, and resentments” and does not
necessarily and only reﬂect economic and material interests. Although Hadiz emphasises
political economy, his approach is in tune with Ostiguy’s socio-cultural approach since
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Hadiz also acknowledges that cross-class alliances are possible due to social and cultural
dynamics shaped by history. More speciﬁcally, Hadiz observes that the AKP successfully
brought together segments of the pious Turkish bourgeoisie, the urban and rural poor and
the new urban middle classes in a neo-liberal setting associated with global capitalism.
Hadiz deﬁnes (2016, 34) the new urban middle class as “lumpen-intelligentsia . . . people
with comparatively high levels of education but who ﬁnd themselves stuck nonetheless in
the lower tiers of the socio-economic and political hierarchy.” In coalition with the urban
poor and the pious bourgeoisie, these groups’ “aspirations and grievances [were] symbo-
lically conveyed through the idioms of Islam,” but hadmaterial and political “interests” and
“agendas” that united them (Hadiz 2014, 132).
While in agreement with his general argument, this article diverges from Hadiz (2014;
2016) in terms ofmethodology.Hadiz selects threeMuslim-majority countries and focuses on
Indonesia as the primary case, leading him to group them under the label “Islamic populism.”
In contrast, this article’s primary case, Turkey, is grouped with India and Thailand, where
there are no religious similarities. This case selection allows for more generalisation, taking
into account civilisational divides, going beyond religion and including antagonisms within
societies based on the elitist understanding of what is “proper” in contrast to the ways and
manners of “the people.” This is in line with Ostiguy’s more general approach and reinforces
Hadiz’s arguments that religion is not the only element in theAKP’s appeal and other religions
can be used for similar purposes in other countries, including in India (Hadiz 2018, 568–569).
Turkey, India and Thailand in Comparison
For various reasons in Turkey’s political and social history, the AKP’s populism is a blend
that combines civilisational discourses with socio-cultural diﬀerences in deﬁning “the
people” and “the elite,” neo-liberalism with social assistance, a cross-class coalition with
strong grassroots party organisation and mobilisation with personalistic centralisation. As
will be shown below through a descriptive overview of the cases, this blend is similar to two
Asian political parties, India’s BJP and Thailand’s now defunct TRT.
Taking shape in diﬀerent religious, institutional, geographical and political settings, the
commonalities between the three parties are not immediately obvious. The experiences of
the parties themselves have also been diﬀerent. The BJP was founded in 1980 by politicians
with connections with the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (1951–1977) and the Janata Party
(1977–1980). After leading a coalition government between 1998 and 2004, the BJP won
an absolute majority of the seats and came to national power under the leadership of
Narendra Modi in 2014, renewing its mandate inMay 2019. The TRT was founded in 1998
under Thaksin Shinawatra’s leadership and won the national election in 2001. Five years
later, the TRT government was overthrown by a military coup and Thaksin ﬂed Thailand.
Although the TRT was succeeded by two other parties, another military intervention in
2014 ended this experience as well. In the elections of March 2019, conducted under
military rule, the Pheu Thai Party, as heir of TRT, won most seats in parliament despite
a decline in its vote share. This article cannot detail the background of the BJP and TRT.
The main purpose of this section is to demonstrate in systematic fashion what some
scholars have so far ignored or mentioned only in passing – that the AKP’s populism has
more commonalities with recent cases of populism in India and Thailand than with Europe
and Latin America (Bozkurt 2013; Harriss 2015; Ohm 2015; Yıldırım 2009).
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Civilisational Discourse: Deﬁning “the People” and “the Elite”
Recent manifestations of populism in Turkey, India and Thailand have underscored
a civilisation divide with historical antecedents in these societies, as highlighted by Ostiguy’s
(2017) socio-cultural approach to populism. In line with this approach, the sections belowwill
brieﬂy analyse the Turkish, Indian andThai populists’ discourses on nationalism and religion,
how the antagonisms they highlight between “the people” and “the elite” reﬂect socio-
economic and cultural divisions and how they address issues of minorities and migration.
Turkey
Since its foundation, the AKP has claimed to represent the hitherto politically repressed and
marginalised masses against the state elite and the political establishment (Dinçşahin 2012,
618–640). This masses versus the state divide in Turkey can be traced back to historical
dynamics and the establishment of the Turkish Republic out of the Ottoman Empire in the
aftermath of World War I. The military leaders, who expelled European armies, set up the
Republic and founded theRepublicanPeople’s Party (CumhuriyetHalk Partisi–CHP) regime
that governed single-handedly until 1950. These state elites, including the military leaders,
explicitly aimed to modernise Turkey along Western and European lines of republicanism,
secularism and nationalism. Political change went in tandem with top-down social reforms,
includingmajor amendments to the daily lives of citizens, such as personal names, dress codes,
family life and the use of language, which remain contested (Palabiyik 2018).
Such contested social reforms are now reﬂected in what Ostiguy (2017, 75–76) refers to as
a civilisational divide, which is paralleled in the Turkish case with a rift between the religious
and the secular (Çınar 2018). On the one hand, in the Turkish context, “the elites” has
indicated an intellectual and economic upper class with a more Western-looking and
“modern” lifestyle. These are the so-calledwhite Turks,whohave adhered to the revolutionary
reforms dubbed Kemalism, named after the founder of the Republic, Kemal Atatürk. On the
other hand, “the people” has corresponded to the lower classes from the Anatolian heartland
and the poorer areas of urban centres, with Islamist and conservative outlooks and seemingly
more traditional ways of life, referred to as the “black Turks” (Arat-Koç 2018, 397–401;
Demiralp 2012).
The AKP is not the only political party in Turkish history to tap this divide. The party
emerged from a long lineage of conservative parties that used religious symbolism and were
repressed by consecutive military coups that also clamped down on leftist parties. With this
historical background, in the early years of AKP rule, “the elite”meant most fundamentally
the secular military and judicial establishment. During its ﬁrst two terms in oﬃce, in
seeking to break the secular state elites’ grip on power, the party emphasised goals
associated with European Union membership and democracy. Once the military and the
judiciary were brought under control following coup investigations after 2007, however, the
enemies changed character and external culprits (mostly Europe and the USA), as well as
their internal collaborators, gradually took centre stage (Aytaç and Elçi 2018, 99–100;
Erçetin and Erdoğan 2018; Yabanci 2016, 598–600).
Domestic enemies were identiﬁed to include secular CHP voters, the “interest rate
lobby” (Daragahi 2018), the religious movement let by Fethullah Gülen (Taş 2018) and
the Kurds who do not support the AKP (Martin 2018). All were tarred by the same brush,
accused of being “terrorists” or “coup sympathisers/putschists.” They are declared “traitors
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to the homeland” and are said to pose an immediate (yet obscure) threat by weakening
Turkey or preventing its rise (Selçuk 2016, 578). These enemies are then juxtaposed against
“the people” who are referred to as the millet, which has ethnic and religious connotations
(Akturk 2009, 893–909). Drawing on xenophobic beliefs of grandeur and a re-deﬁned
gloriousness of the Ottoman past, this conceptualisation of millet as the “Muslim nation”
relates to a civilisational divide between theWest and Sunni Islam (White 2014). This leads
the AKP to also speak for pious Muslims around the world and most notably in the Middle
East. In foreign policy, especially after 2007, the party has had “pan-Islamist” ambitions of
having inﬂuence in areas where the Ottoman Empire once ruled (Ozkan 2014, 119–140).
The civilisational viewpoint has also led to the welcoming of around three million Sunni
immigrants from Syria as religious brethren, giving some of them citizenship and making
them “one of us” as opposed to, for instance, the opposition Kurds, who are an “Other.”
The refugee crisis in Syria has given an opportunity to pose a civilisation discourse:
according to the government “while Turkey opens its doors to the refugees, providing
a protector place . . . ‘they’ (the West) have failed to achieve, building discriminatory
walls . . . ” (Erçetin and Erdoğan 2018, 389).
India
This dominance of a civilisational divide that underscores populism is also evident in the
case of India. The 2014 electoral victory of the BJP rested in part on socio-cultural
exclusion. In terms similar to the AKP’s populism, the BJP used religion and nationalism
in an intertwining way to designate “the Hindu people” and to distinguish them from “the
corrupt elite” and to exclude the minorities (Chacko 2018, 541). In parallel with Turkey, the
divide between “the people” and “the elite” has in part corresponded to a devout versus
secular rift with clear civilisational undertones which attempts to pit Hinduism against
Westernism (Roy 2018). As Jaﬀrelot and Tillin summarise (2017, 184), for BJP populists,
“their enemies are not the establishment deﬁned in socio-economic terms but an establish-
ment deﬁned in cultural terms, a groupmade of English-speakingWesternised – uprooted –
elites who defend secularism at the expense of the authentic Hindu identity of the nation.”
Similar to the AKP’s opposition to the secular rulers represented by the CHP, the
BJP (and its predecessors) have focused on the Indian National Congress party that has
ruled India for most of its history since independence (McDonnell and Cabrera 2018,
489–490). Congress’ secular policies are inclusive of the Muslims and Christians while
the oﬃcial ideology of the BJP, Hindu nationalism (or Hindutva), stresses that Hindu
culture and religion cannot be separated from Indian nationhood. Hindutva aims at
religious and cultural hegemony over minorities and the “reconversion” of Muslims
and Christians to Hinduism (Palshikar 2015, 728). This xenophobic understanding is
similar to the exclusionary type of populism of the European radical right.
However, the BJP is distinguished from the European radical right in two practical ways
that show it as similar to the AKP. First, like Turkey, immigration has not been a core issue
in India because of negative net migration levels since the 1990s (Net Migration Rate 2017).
Moreover, the religious focus of the party resulted in a more nuanced treatment of
migration. The BJP rejects Muslim immigrants from neighbouring countries in tune with
its antagonism towards Muslims and in ways that are quite similar to the AKP’s “othering”
of the Kurds in Turkey (McDonnell and Cabrera 2018, 490–492). Yet, Hindu immigrants,
mainly from Bangladesh, are welcomed and promised citizenship (Daniyal 2015). Similar
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to the AKP’s policy of accepting “friendly” immigrants, the BJP has welcomed Hindu
brethren escaping from neighbouring countries.
Second, unlike the welfare chauvinism of the European populists which seeks to
“protect” the welfare state from immigrants, the BJP has increased its support among the
lower classes with promises of an expansion of the nascent welfare state. Themiddle classes
have traditionally supported the BJP more, but as Jaﬀrelot (2015, 20–21) shows, in the 2014
elections the party also increased its vote among the poor and the lower classes. The party,
indeed, formed a cross-class coalition, using three methods: (i) theHindutva was expanded
to the Other Backward Classes in the 1990s and the ethnic discourse overcame class
diﬀerences; (ii) the party outsourced to its aﬃliate associations the provision of public
goods, such as health and education, building social relationships between the voters and
activists that could be translated into votes (Thachil 2014); (iii) Modi used his own Other
Backward Classes background as a tea seller symbolically to denote upwardmobility for the
aspiring lower classes (Sen 2016, 101). In its election manifesto, the party referred to the
demands of the “neo-middle classes” “for better public services” and pledged various
schemes (Jaﬀrelot 2015, 26). After the BJP came to power, a digitised welfare scheme was
introduced partly in line with these promises (Chacko 2018, 557).When combined with the
religious and nationalist discourse that does not translate into a general and strong anti-
immigration discourse, this cross-class alliance that the BJP forged leads to the conclusion
that the party does not lend itself neatly to classiﬁcation as either exclusionary nor
inclusionary populism. In the words of McDonnell and Cabrera (2018, 495–496):
The case of the BJP suggests the need to revise the idea that populism always appeals most
to “the left behind.” . . . The BJP in 2014 combined neoliberal economic oﬀer with social
conservatism. The party thus seems something of a hybrid between neo-liberal (but not
nativist) populists like Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and protectionist (and nativist) populists
like the French Rassemblement National.
Thailand
A similar conclusion can also be reached for the TRT. Thai politics has long been dominated
by elites, united around the royal house and consisting of the military, business, judiciary
and political branches (McCargo 2005). Responding to constitutional changes that followed
a bloody civilian uprising against a military-dominated regime in 1992, the TRT won an
election in 2001 by oﬀering policies that were attractive for farmers and workers, and
especially those in and from the poorer northern and northeastern regions. Most of the
schemes oﬀered to attract voters consisted of economic entitlements. Thaksin promised
easy credit for rural communities, a three-year debt moratorium to the farmers and state
health care that was essentially free (Montesano 2002). Before the 2005 elections, Thaksin
added more promises to his list, such as allotting livestock, land titles, ponds, more credit
and funds to farmers and aﬀordable education and housing that appealed to workers. In
what looked like an impossible task, the TRT campaign also talked about eliminating
poverty altogether (Pasuk and Baker 2008, 67). TRT won a landslide victory but that win
also marked the beginning of Thaksin’s falling out with “the elite.” While Thaksin did not
neglect nationalist shibboleths, compared with India andTurkey, the inclusiveness of TRT’s
populism rested on economic distribution rather than nationalism and for that reason, the
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TRT better matches inclusionary populism than the exclusionary form (Moﬃtt 2015,
293–316).
Thaksin’s use of symbols of nation and state were restricted partly because the opposing
elite groups and especially the royal family, held monopoly over such identiﬁers (Baker 2005,
131–132). Nevertheless, the underlying dichotomy between “the people” and “the elite” was
also a civilisational one, as Ostiguy’s (2017) approach suggests. This divide shared close
aﬃnities with the AKP’s populism. As Zarakol (2013) shows, both the Ottoman and the Thai
empires were not formally colonised but felt the need to modernise and centralise the state in
order to compete with Western powers. While Kemalism and secularism eventually became
the ideological foundation of these elites in Turkey, the military, monarchy and royalism
underpinned the dominance of Thai elites. However, in both, modernity and Western-ness
were key elements that also became part of middle-class identity. With the opening of the
economies to global markets in the 1980s, in both countries new businesses and middle
classes emerged, which shared in some respects the traditional lifestyles of the urban and rural
poor. Both Erdoğan and Thaksin were identiﬁed as representatives of these new businesses, as
well as the previously marginalised poor, viliﬁed by the traditional elites as backward,
ignorant, irrational and uncivilised. Thus, even though there was no overt emphasis on
nationalism or religion in Thaksin’s populism, the civilisational divide shaped by Thailand’s
historical circumstances is undeniable and a focus on only material concerns would “mask
deeper patterns of stratiﬁcation” (Zarakol 2013, 160). It was the elite around the Thai
monarchy that was alarmed by the possibility of “the loss of state identity as they know
it . . . deﬁned by a certain understanding of monarchy and its mission” (Zarakol 2013, 154).
They accused Thaksin – amongst many “sins” – of “brainwashing” the rural poor and
pandering to their “undisciplined needs and wants” (Hewison 2017, 433). By speaking to
and for this “unpresentable Other,” Thaksin “ﬂaunted” their ways as the “authentic Self”
(Ostiguy 2017, 93) and increasingly embraced populism to break the old elite’s opposition
(Hewison 2017).
As noted above, Thaksin’s discourse did not use much overt nationalism, but he was still
a nationalist. For example, in 2003 Thaksin began a “war on drugs” which killed over
a thousand people and raised concerns over human rights violations. During this “war,”
Thaksin proclaimed himself as the redeemer of Thailand’s morals and health and thus,
reinforced nationalist sentiments. Likewise, during TRT’s time in government, a Malay
Muslim insurgency reignited in Thailand’s deep south and the government responded with
heavy-handed military repression (Croissant 2007). This resembles Turkey’s nationalist
ﬁght against the Kurdish insurgents and the BJP’s clashes with Muslims.
The similarity is also seen in responses to immigration. After having a negative net
migration rate in the 1990–1995 period, Thailand had positive levels of migration between
1995 and 2015 (Net Migration Rate 2017). During these years, most immigrants to
Thailand were from neighbouring countries, such as Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia.
Overwhelmingly, they migrated for work. The governments before TRT portrayed migrant
workers as a danger to the employment opportunities of the Thais, which included plans
for forced deportation after the 1997 crisis (Darunee 2001). But the Thaksin government
reversed this policy through a parliamentary resolution in August 2001 and lifted restric-
tions on migrant workers, regions where they could work and types of employment they
could undertake. These policies of the Thaksin government were “widely criticized” for
“giving away” employment “easily” (Darunee 2001). In contrast to India and Turkey, this
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA 13
approach to migration was led more by pro-business attitudes than by ethnic brotherhood
and aﬃnities. However, it is clear that the TRT’s approach to migrants was quite diﬀerent
from the exclusionary discourse used by the European populists due to diﬀerent historical,
economic and geographical circumstances and creating a blend of mixed populism similar
to the AKP. Indeed, even in this case of populism, which was more explicitly class-driven
and had no overt religious discourses, it is possible to ﬁnd socio-cultural diﬀerences,
identities and grievances playing a role as Ostiguy’s deﬁnition of populism highlights.
Economic Policies, Organisation and Mobilisation
The similarities of populisms in Turkey, India and Thailand in terms of their strategic
attributes are perhaps more striking than the civilisation discourses discussed above. In
all three countries, the populist parties adopted pro-business economic policies that
were also dubbed “neo-liberal.” Yet, in tandem with Hadiz’s (2016) approach, all three
parties formed cross-class alliances, representing both business interests and the new
middle and lower classes. Facing economic crises or forming during ﬁnancial turmoil in
the case of Turkey and Thailand, all three parties found ways to integrate with the
global capitalist economy while claiming to represent the interests of their cross-class
supporters. Organisationally, the personalistic leadership style of Erdoğan, Modi and
Thaksin have been evident in all three countries, as expected of neo-liberal populism
and discussed by Ostiguy (2017). However, all three populist movements also have had
relatively strong mass organisations that can be mobilised, like the radical populist
variant. As a result of their historically shaped socio-cultural and civilisational conﬂicts,
all three populists on occasion mobilised their supporters to defeat their enemies.
Turkey
The AKP has been coded as a party that has successfully combined Islamism with neo-
liberal capitalism (see, for instance, Atasoy 2009; Tuğal 2009). Compared with the ﬁrst
era of neo-liberalism that started in the 1980s, the AKP’s policies went deeper on the
privatisation of state enterprises, setting up of new regulatory boards, decreasing public
spending, the suppression of real wages and shrinking the agricultural sector (Aytaç and
Öniş 2014, 50; Bahçe and Köse 2017, 578; Karaman 2013, 3416). In terms of maintain-
ing growth rates, the party also appeared to do well, reaching an 11% growth rate in the
peak year of 2011 and well above the 2% OECD average in the same year (OECD 2019).
In its economic policies, the party appeased businesses, by legalising ﬂexible, sub-
contracted and temporary labour and by breaking the power of independent labour
unions (Bozkurt 2013, 379–380; Yabanci 2016; Yıldırım 2009, 40–41). The AKP came to
power in an alliance with Anatolian businessmen, whose conservatism, religiosity and
lack of economic opportunities had put them at a disadvantage relative to more secular
big businesses in Istanbul and the Marmara region (Hadiz 2016, 110–112). These
“Anatolian tigers” have been systematically favoured by the AKP in public procurement
and construction contracts awarded by national and local level public institutions,
exposing the economy to clientelism, corruption and crony capitalism on previously
unprecedented scales (Buğra and Savaşkan 2014; Gürakar 2016).
Despite the mismanagement of the economy in the long run, the AKP has held onto its
constituency from the lower classes until at least 2018 by reforming the welfare state,
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increasing lower-class access to bank loans and credit cards and distributing social assistance
to the poor through charities, philanthropic organisations and private donors (Özdemir 2015,
10–24). These policies have led to mixed results for the lower classes: on the one hand,
breaking their possible organised resistance, and on the other, awarding material beneﬁts in
exchange for party loyalty (Akcay 2018; Bahçe and Köse 2017; Bozkurt 2013; Eder 2014).
Party loyalty has worked hand-in-hand with party membership, which in 2017, stood at
almost 9.5 million – eight times more than the CHP and about one in every nine citizens
(Diken, February 24, 2018). The AKP has developed a strong party organisation with
a hierarchically ordered and centrally controlled body that penetrates even the remotest
corners of Turkey. Membership is controlled by the headquarters of the party and, because
the main source of income is state subsidies (a feature of the Law on Political Parties), the
grassroots is dependent on the higher echelons of the party for resources (Kumbaracıbaşı
2009). Thus, the party leadership is materially autonomous, but has at its disposal a party
apparatus that can be used year-round, not only during election times.
In the AKP’s organisational framework, the role of Erdoğan is critical. Although he
was a ﬁrst among equals when the party was founded in the 2000s, later he bypassed his
comrades and became a personalistic ﬁgure (Castaldo 2018, 479). Rather than having
messianic or divine characteristics, Erdoğan’s leadership style rests on his meticulous
control over his organisation, micro-management of every level of the party and
a constant dynamism in holding mass rallies, meetings and speeches with party loyalists
around the country (Baykan 2018, 106–141).
President Erdoğan commands a party base that can be used in activities related to elections,
but also as a reserve force that can bemobilised on the streets against opponents. Erdoğan, for
instance, threatened to mobilise his supporters following the Gezi Park protests in 2013
(Hürriyet, June 4, 2017). Three years later, on the night of July 15, 2016, Erdoğan did ask
people to defend the government by going onto the streets against an attemptedmilitary coup.
Thousands responded and the coup failed partially because of this unprecedented and quick
mobilisation. For weeks after the coup, Erdoğan called on his supporters to stay on the streets
in case of a second coup attempt, signiﬁcantly demonstrating the capacity of the party to use its
grassroots as a reserve army against opponents, similar to radical populists in Latin America.
India
One of the reasons for the BJP’s success in the 2014 elections was its campaign on the
economy and the failure of the previous government to sustain economic growth and beneﬁts
to the middle classes. Modi highlighted his own success as chief minister of Gujarat for 13
years, touting the state’s growth rates and economic development. He promised that he
would reproduce this “economic miracle” nationwide by eﬃcient governance, new develop-
mental projects and building infrastructure. The neo-liberal agenda of the party was sum-
marised in the slogan “maximum governance andminimum government” (Kumar 2014, 51).
Such promises attracted India’s big corporations and the wealthy families who owned them,
as well as the BJP’s traditional voter base, the middle classes.
Since coming to power, the BJP government has continuedwith neo-liberal policies. The
party announced in early 2016 a privatisation initiative with the aim of sellingUS$8.4 billion
worth of shares in state enterprises (Financial Times, March 7, 2016). Under Modi’s
leadership, India increased foreign direct investment by nearly 40% between 2014 and
2016, in line with Modi’s “Make in India” campaign (TheWall Street Journal, September 2,
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2016). Although new welfare schemes were introduced for poor families with digitised
databases and bank accounts, the new government also “weakened many labour protocols
and environmental regulations . . ., reduced public spending in primary education and basic
health and undercut many of the landmark rights-based acts that distinguished the tenure
of the [previous government]” (Ruparelia 2015, 757–758).
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant economic reform that Modi unleashed was the demonetisa-
tion drive which began in November 2016. The drive involved the removal of 500 and
1,000 rupee bank notes from circulation that amounted to the 86% of bills in circulation. One
of the discourses for this radical move was from a populist playbook. The wealthy were
evading taxation and “this crisis” that was generated by “the corrupt elite” required decisive
and immediate action. Those who criticised the move were declared “anti-national,” “the
people,” who were hurt were hailed for their sacriﬁce. The need to strengthen the formal
economy, to move on to a “cashless society” and to increase the “ﬁnancial inclusion of the
poor and especially, the neo-middle classes” was also emphasised, similar to the AKP’s
extension of new credit facilities to the lower classes. Modi’s policy also highlighted a neo-
liberal desire, as oneminister put it, to “ﬂush” the banks “with funds” so that they can “lend it
to productive sectors” (cited in Chacko 2018, 559).
Like the neo-liberal populism of the AKP, the BJP also diverges from its Latin American
counterparts with its organisational attributes. The BJP is backed by, and Modi has been
a member of, the National Volunteers’Organisation (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh –RSS),
a paramilitary group formed in 1925. The RSS and other Hindu nationalists are frequently
mobilised and their activities lead to communal conﬂict and attacks against Muslims,
including in Gujarat during Modi’s time as chief minister. Moreover, the BJP is well-
organised at the local level throughout India. With its 88 million members (more than
double the number of Congress members), it is arguably “the largest political party in the
world” (Quartz India, March 31, 2015). As an organisationally thick party, commanding
grassroots aﬃliates, the BJP can recruit voters among the poor through the distribution of
private goods but based also on personal relationships (Thachil 2014).
Despite the BJP’s robust organisation, before the 2014 elections, Modi formed direct links
with the voters through technological mechanisms, such as speeches via hologram. It has
been this personalistic centralisation of power that has carried the BJP to government and
that has marked Modi’s rule since 2014 (Manor 2015, 737–739; Jaﬀrelot and Tillin 2017).
However, Modi’s 2014 success was in part also due to his ability to appeal to “vote mobilisers”
to reach local communities with no easy access to information. In as big and diverse a country
as India, vote mobilisers donate money, campaign door-to-door or put up posters advertising
the party, although most of them are not members and expect material beneﬁts for their
service (Chhibber and Ostermann 2014). Thus, the BJP has relied on a mixture of strategies,
including Modi’s personalistic style, organisational links with the RSS, strong party organisa-
tion and local activism, setting the BJP apart from the typical cases of neo-liberal populism.
Thailand
The TRT came to power following the 1997–1998 economic crisis, which had led to an IMF
agreement and a strict application of neo-liberal principles of ﬁscal cuts, retrenchment of the
state and privatisations. In an economic environment that had already damaged big business
in Thailand, the IMF programme beneﬁted foreign investors, giving them opportunities in
the privatisation schemes (Hewison 2005). Faced with competition from foreign capital,
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domestic businesspeople turned to a strategy of capturing state power. Thaksin – a wealthy
business tycoon himself – founded the TRT in 1998 with this “principal mission,” “to rescue
Thai business people from the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis and to restore economic growth” (Pasuk
and Baker 2008, 64). The TRT advocated a mildly nationalist form of capitalism that would
restrict some foreign shareholding in some enterprises. It continued with privatisations,
favoured employers over labour, facilitated free trade and reduced state involvement in the
economy (Pasuk and Baker 2005, 65–68). Although Thaksin did not strictly adhere to IMF
prescriptions, he was likened to Peru’s Fujimori and the neo-liberal populists of Latin
America because of his party’s economic policies and links with domestic capital (Moﬃtt
2015, 307; Pasuk and Baker 2008, 73–77). However, unlike them (and as explained above), he
balanced his big business bias with universal welfare schemes to the poor in rural areas and to
the informal sector and workers in urban settings in a more inclusionary fashion. Again
similar to the AKP, coming to power after an economic crisis, the party could also promise
sustained economic growth rates, reaching to 7% in the peak year of 2003 (amajor surge from
-8% in 1998) that would appeal to a cross-class alliance (World Bank 2019).
Like Erdoğan and Modi, Thaksin himself was at the centre of the populist appeal. He
appeared as a successful businessman and assured small and mid-sized businesspeople
similar kinds of upward mobility. He blended his personalistic control over the party
and the government with high membership levels to the TRT and social mobilisation
strategies. While critics like McCargo and Ukrist (2005, 86–89) are sceptical of some
claims made about TRT membership, the TRT had a registered membership of around
8.5 million in 2003, six times more than its closest competitor, the Democrat Party. The
levels of membership were important in order to receive associated state funding, but
also, similar to the AKP, to provide a possible grassroots force that could be mobilised
when faced with an elite attack. The value of such mobilisation was made clear by the
march of the Assembly of the Poor on Bangkok in 1997 and their subsequent months-
long protests that provided the ideal ground for the populist discourse based on the
grievances of the rural poor to spring up, although, at ﬁrst Thaksin “paid little attention
to this discourse” (Hellmann 2017, 167). However, after 2001 and more so before the
2005 elections, Thaksin embraced the discourse as well as the mobilisational strategy.
The value of mobilisation of the poor became especially clear for Thaksin and the
TRT following the 2006 coup (Hewison 2017, 435–437). A grassroots movement started
with the Caravan of the Poor marching on Bangkok to defend Thaksin. His followers
later established the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) and wore
red shirts to symbolise their opposition to anti-Thaksin groups (Markou 2016). With
every change of government and at any critical political moment, the red shirts were
actively mobilised, oftentimes clashing with security forces and with anti-Thaksin
groups. The activities of the UDD reached new heights in 2009 and 2010, when they
stormed the 2009 ASEAN Summit in Pattaya and seized several locations in Bangkok in
both years. In the end the UDD was not successful in preventing the 2014 coup, but this
turn towards civil society mobilisation and organisation after 2006 is a feature that sets
the Thai case apart from the neo-liberal populist experience in Latin America and is
similar to the AKP’s mobilisation strategy.
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Conclusion
This article started with a simple observation: there is no consensus in the literature on the
type of populism and regional variation that the AKP conﬁrms to. After identifying the root
cause of this discord in the literature, the article asked how the AKP should be categorised
based on all its main attributes. The main ﬁnding of this article is that when its discourses,
economic policies and organisational dynamics are considered together, populism in
Turkey constitutes a speciﬁc ideological and strategic blend that contains elements from
previous typologies. Although it does not resemble populists from Europe and Latin
America, it has interesting similarities with the BJP in India and the TRT in Thailand.
There are three implications of this ﬁnding for the broader literature on populism. First, by
showing how one “theory-inﬁrming” case does not belong to the most dominant types of
populism identiﬁed by the general literature, this article supports calls for a more compre-
hensive approach to populism, combining ideology and strategy with historically shaped
socio-cultural dynamics. This type of socio-cultural reading of populism, as explicitly advo-
cated byOstiguy (2017) and in similar ways applied to case studywork byHadiz (2014, 2016),
would go beyond analyses of class dynamics and religious divisions while including and
combining them. It would stress how populist alliances that cross-cut economic interests can
be formed among various social groups, based on civilisational discourses, economic policies
and organisational instruments that are unique to countries, speciﬁc periods and geographical
settings.
Second, this article highlights the need to expand the literature to other geographical
areas. As others have also noticed, the literature on populism has an apparent “Atlantic
bias” (Moﬃtt 2015, 293–295) and is still very much dominated by cases from Western
Europe and Latin America (Hadiz and Chryssogelos 2017, 399–400; Rovira Kaltwasser et al.
2017, 12–13). While typologies based on these continents may work for these regions and
others with similar historical patterns, Turkey, India and Thailand are countries that had
diﬀerent experiences of nation-building and civilisational projects in the twentieth century.
Further research can dig deeper into these experiences and investigate how they manifest
themselves in contemporary populism from a more causal and explanatory framework.
Third, this article draws attention to the need to develop a new typology of populism by
using comprehensive deﬁnitions of the phenomenon. This article while critical of existent
typologies did not try to replace them. Such an eﬀort would have required analysing as
many global instances of populism as possible and including cases selected from diﬀerent
religious, geographical and developmental settings. A proper comparative analysis of the
cases, then, would necessitate greater resources for a larger project producing ﬁndings that
could go beyond this article. The goal of this article was modest but its ﬁndings direct
research to more ambitious aims which could be taken up by others.
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